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1. Introduction  
The achievement of renewable targets is one of the main drivers influencing the design of 
specific mechanisms for procuring renewable generation resources. Different procurement 
mechanisms respond to different needs, requirements and policy objectives. Electric utilities 
are (or should be) searching for cost-efficient methods that allow them greater flexibility in 
meeting their specific needs and future demands. Some of these mechanisms are based on 
competitive solicitations and auctions and others are based on specific subsidies.  
In addition, based on the EU third energy package about unbundling (Directive 2009/72/EC- 
Electricity Directive), the members are required to ensure the separation of the vertically 
integrated energy firms. This means that the Distribution System Operators (DSOs), serving 
more than 100,000 customers, shall be independent from other activities not relating to 
distribution (generation, transmission and supply). Following [1], the majority of countries 
have fully implemented the third package. Great Britain is among the countries that has 
transposed into national the Article 28 of the Directive and has completed the unbundling 
mandate
3
. Thus, its Distribution Network Operators (DNOs)
4
 are not allowed to procure 
energy resources. The distribution licences require (DNOs) to connect generators on a first-
come first-served basis without any discrimination between different types of generation. One 
of the main problems that DNOs are facing now is the significant increase in the number of 
connection applications and the low rate of acceptance of DG connections. The elimination of 
the up-front assessment and design fees has contributed to this increase [3].  
The current regulatory framework in Great Britain mandates common national policies for 
the connection of DG customers (set in the Distribution Licence). DNOs are not encouraged 
to lead specific competitive processes for the connection of more DG with a focus on small 
size distributed generation projects. We are aware of the transaction costs that this kind of 
mechanism may add, especially to small-scale projects, however we are also aware of the 
benefits that competitive mechanism may provide in the integration of DG to the distribution 
grid. The implementation of this mechanism can help the DNO deals with the increase of DG 
queries and the low rate of connection offer acceptance, and can encourage more efficient use 
of the electric infrastructure. This approach may require detailed negotiations between the 
DNOs and each project that helps to fit the needs of both parties and to reduce unnecessary 
transaction costs. However this has worked successfully elsewhere. Even though Feed-in 
Tariff and quota systems are the most popular support mechanisms, with the number of states, 
provinces and countries that have respectively adopted them as of 2013 being 98 and 79; the 
global trend in feed-in schemes is centered on reduction (or even removals) of support [4]. 
Tendering or auctions are becoming more important: a total of 55 countries have turned to 
public auctions as of early 2014, in comparison with 9 countries in 2009. Central and South 
American countries remain the global leaders in renewable energy tenders [4]. 
This study explores different experiences that promote the connection of cost-effective 
energy projects (with a focus on distributed generation) by electric utilities and identifies the 
advantages and disadvantages of the different competitive methods applied. The paper 
focuses on competitive mechanisms and evaluates the design elements and the associated 
regulatory framework. In contrast with other studies, which mainly refer to centralised 
auctions including those related to system adequacy [5,6], this one refers to decentralised 
competitive mechanisms; those carried out by electric utilities instead of government or 
energy regulators. This study contributes to the literature of decentralised competitive 
mechanisms applied to small scale DG. We discuss four case studies from the USA. The 
                                                 
3
 Around 50% of the countries have already transposed this article into national law [2].  
4
 This term refers to DSO in Great Britain. DNOs hold a licence that enables them to operate in a regional 
distribution service area.  
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USA is one of the few countries where the actual competitive mechanisms for the 
procurement of distributed generation resources are well-documented. The case studies refer 
to competitive mechanisms with a focus on small and medium size renewable generators. 
Based on the evaluation of the US experience, we identify and discuss the lessons from 
competitive mechanisms and the way DNOs in Great Britain – as an example of an EU 
country - may implement a similar approach while taking into account the EU third package 
mandate.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section two describes the most common competitive 
mechanism practices for the procurement of renewable generation. Section three explores 
four different case studies from the USA with a focus on competitive mechanisms. Section 
four discusses the main findings and lessons of the case studies and proposes the design 
elements of the competitive mechanism applicable to Great Britain which can also be 
replicated to the rest of European countries following the EC third package rules. The last 
section sets the conclusions of this study. 
 
2. Current Procurement Strategies for  Distributed Generation Resources   
 
This section introduces the most common practices for the procurement of generation re-
sources by electric utilities using competitive mechanisms. A description of the main oppor-
tunities and challenges that each approach offers is presented. Two categories of procurement 
methods have been identified: Request for Proposals (RFP) and auctions.  The RFP is the cat-
egory that applied most widely in the USA. FIT is also among the most popular schemes for 
allocating renewable generation capacity. Even though its advantages (e.g. guaranteed pay-
ment, certainty to generators, lower administrative costs) one of its main drawbacks is that 
FIT prices do not necessarily represent the most cost-efficient projects. This may have a neg-
ative impact on electricity customers. FIT prices are set administratively, thus the chance of 
overcompensation is high. An extended explanation of additional categories, including FIT, 
can be found at [7].  
 
2.1 Requests for Proposal (RFP)  
RFP is one of the main mechanisms in the USA used to achieve a state level mandatory 
Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) in the promotion of renewable energy generation. RPS, 
a quota system support scheme, is the main regulatory instrument that promotes generation of 
electricity from renewable resources in the USA. As of March 2013, 29 states have adopted 
RPS, 8 states and 2 territories have adopted renewable portfolio goals
5
. Other countries such 
as the UK, Belgium, Chile and Italy have also adopted this mechanism [8]. RFP involves a 
bidding process that can take different forms (e.g. pre-qualification following by single round 
of sealed bids and then selection based on “Least-cost/Best-Fit” 6  basis). Its design and 
requirements vary across states, and different renewable targets have been established which 
reflect their particular needs. RFP is usually associated with the procurement of renewable 
generation of large-scale generators. The bidding process may involve energy and capacity 
payments and the purchase of Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs). Some requirements 
                                                 
5
 See: http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/summarymaps/RPS_map.pdf 
6
 The Least-cost best-fit is specific RPS statute applicable in California that helps to rank the selection of least 
cost and best fit renewable resources. Least cost bids are those with the lowest costs (direct and indirect 
including those for the integration of the resource and transmission investment) that fit the best to their system 
needs. See D.04-07-029 at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PUBLISHED/FINAL_DECISION/38287.htm 
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also involve a combination of projects (technology neutral or specific) and the option of 
ownership by the electric utilities after their implementation. 
The procurement process is generally managed by the electric utility or a group of electric 
utilities that operate within the same jurisdiction or state government or local authorities. 
However, an independent evaluator may be required for the evaluation of offers. The 
periodicities of these competitions and the delivery time for the procured products also vary 
across states (from months to years). RFP encourages the selection of the most cost-efficient 
projects securing lower costs to ratepayers. However, the option of under-bidding or over-
bidding is also a possibility. Following [7], under-bidding is a choice due to the 
competitiveness nature of this approach and over-bidding also may occur if developers 
include in their offers transactions costs and a risk premium. However, the high transaction 
costs associated with this mechanism may limit the participation of small projects including 
those from independent generators and from local community initiatives. Among the 
countries that faced high transaction and administrative costs in energy auctions are Ireland 
(Alternative Energy Requirement – AER), France (EOLE Programme) and the UK (Non-
Fossil Fuel Obligation - NFFO) [6]. 
The use of standard contracts, which are usually published in advance (by electric utilities, 
local authorities or independent evaluators) in the pro forma power purchase agreement 
(PPA), accelerates the evaluation of the different offers. The pro forma needs to be approved 
by the local authority before its publication. Skilled developers are usually the most 
representative bidders in this kind of competitive mechanism, this fact along with the 
oversight of the local authority and the use of a standard RFP helps to reduce the contract 
failure rate. Even though the chances of contract failures are lower in comparison with other 
approaches, there is still a risk. For instance, one of the major problems that the NFFO 
scheme in the UK (a bidding mechanism that was replaced by the Renewables Obligation 
scheme) had was the absence of penalties when generators failed to installed the agreed 
capacity, along with other significant, but fixable, drawbacks that also involved delays in 
building a project [9].  A report from the California Energy Commission [10] shows this rate 
is around 30% regarding the long term RPS contracts (10 years or more), since the start of the 
RPS program. This rate increases to 40% if delayed contracts are considered
7
.  
 
2.2 Auctions  
 
Similar to RFP, auctions are competitive mechanisms that are in search of the most cost-
efficient projects and are generally subject to the same advantages and disadvantages already 
discussed in section 2.1. However, in contrast with RFP, auctions usually are more focused 
on small and medium scale generators – in the US context. In addition, one of the main dif-
ferences between RFP and auctions is that the RFP are subject to a set of non-price criteria 
and in auctions the selection of bids is mainly driven by price alone [7]. The evaluation of the 
four case studies confirms this statement. The transaction costs associated with this mecha-
nism can be seen as a limitation to small size generators; however the introduction of online 
auction platforms mitigates these costs.  
 
                                                 
7
 Data obtained from the Energy Commission’s IOU contract database.   
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The success of auctions is also subject to the existence of enough competition in the market 
and homogeneity. Competition depends on the number of players, market concentration and 
the types of products to be offered and regulation [8]. The stakeholder engagement is also a 
key point that can help with the success of an auction process. Well-informed bidders make 
the auction process much easier for all the parties involved. Workshops and seminars also 
provide the opportunity for small generators to ask for any clarification of the auction (regu-
latory, economics, technical) and the provision of training sessions (e.g. use of excel sheets 
for estimating the bidding price). The appointment of independent evaluators also helps.  
 
Auctions also allow electric utilities to define the conditions of the procurement that reflect 
their particular needs. Auction designs vary and the selection of one or other option would 
depend on the conditions that better fit with the involved parties (e.g. bidders, electric firms, 
regulators). Similar to the RFP, the auction design is subject to many issues in terms of the 
type of auction (sealed-bid auction, clock auction), type of product (electricity and/or capaci-
ty contracts, certificates), centralised versus decentralised auctions, dedicated versus not ded-
icated auctions.  
 
In the USA, Renewable Auction Mechanism (RAM) is the initiative that represents this kind 
of mechanism well. RAM allows the allocation of renewable generation projects from 3 to 20 
MW by the three major IOUs in California. Further details regarding this initiative are given 
in Section 3.1. Brazil is also an interesting case study of procuring renewable and non-
renewable generation open to all generator sizes. This is an example of a centralised auction 
in which distribution firms determine their future demands (for regulated customers) and ag-
gregate them in a large block that represent their electricity requirements. A comparison be-
tween the installed capacity and associated costs regarding two different renewable energy 
support mechanisms (ProInfa
8
 and renewable energy auctions) suggests that the cost of both 
mechanisms has been the same; however the auction scheme has delivered 20% more total 
capacity. In addition, the average energy cost showed a reduction of 25% when auctions were 
used [8]. Another interesting experience is in Peru where electric utilities are allowed to carry 
out the auctions (or to make joint auctions) for supplying regulated customers. However, the 
auction process is subject to strong regulatory supervision and to the application of a price 
cap (set by the energy regulator). Chile has launched an auction scheme which allows genera-
tors (wind and solar PV) to compete for supplying electricity to local electric utilities (regu-
lated customers). The National Energy Commission has recently approved the terms of the 
new energy auctions which targets around 1,000 GWh for 2016 and 2017, 6,000 GWh for 
2018 and 5,000 GWh for 2019
9
. For further details about auction mechanisms in different 
countries see [5,6].  
 
                                                 
8
 Proinfa, created in 2002, was the first scheme that supported Renewable Energy Sources in Brazil.  
9
 See: http://renewables.seenews.com/news/chile-expects-wind-solar-projects-at-next-energy-auctions-report-
438648 
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3. US Practice for the Procurement of Distributed Generation Resources by Electric 
Utilities: Cases studies from California, Colorado, Oregon and New York 
 
Four case studies from the USA have been selected. The four cases refer to wholesale DG 
(WDG) which relates to the sale of energy to the electric utility. Our selection is based on the 
extensive experience that the USA has in the procurement of renewable and non-renewable 
energy sources conducting by electric utilities (decentralised auctions). We have focused only 
on competitive solicitations across the states of California, Colorado, Oregon and New York 
that target small and medium sized generators (with a minimum project size of 2 MW).  We 
explore solicitations from different jurisdictions due to the diversity of 
programmes/initiatives that the respective energy regulators (represented by Public Utilities 
Commissions) mandate in order to increase production of energy from renewable energy 
sources. The four states are among the ones with the highest rates for their RPS. The 
initiatives allow competition between technologies within the same category (i.e. wind versus 
solar PV) and between different technologies (i.e. non-renewable versus renewable). In 
addition, one of the initiatives is a simplified market- based procurement mechanism, while 
the other three relate to the well-known RFP approach. This study concentrates on the 
competitive solicitations carry out by Southern California Edison (Renewable Auction 
Mechanism), Public Service Company of Colorado (RFP), Portland General Electric 
Company (RFP) and Long Island Power Authority (RFP). A detailed comparison is made in 
Appendix 1. Some figures regarding these electric utilities are shown in Table 1, which also 
includes as a European reference, figures from UK Power Networks, the largest DNO in 
Great Britain.  
 
Table 1: Electric Utilities’ Characteristics 
 
 
3.1 Renewable Auction Mechanism (RAM) in California 
 
In December 2010, the Californian Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) adopted a simplified 
market-based procurement mechanism, the Renewable Auction Mechanism (RAM), in order 
to procure renewable energy from projects with a capacity between 3 and 20 MW. The initial 
starting capacity was 1 MW but it was extended to 3 MW later. The three Investor-Owned 
Utilities (IOUs) are required to implement this programme in their respective service 
territories. A total capacity of 1,330 MW has to be procured over a two-year period by 
competitive auctions. Only an eligible renewable resource (ERR)
10
 can participate in the 
                                                 
10
 EER means an electrical generating facility that meets the definition of the renewable electrical generation 
facility in Section 25741 of the California Public Resource Code.  
Company name State Customers (m)
Service territory 
(square mile) Lines (miles)
Southern California Edison California 4.9                               50,000                   
103,000 (distribution lines) 
12,000 (transmission lines)
Public Service Company of Colorado Colorado
1,4 (electric), 1.3 
(natural gas) 32,000                   
10,000 (distribution lines)         
4,000 (transmission lines)
Portland General Electric Company Oregon 0.8 4,000                      
25,000 (distribution and 
transmission lines)
Long Island Power Authority New York 1.1 1,230                      
8,950 (overhead), 4,661 
(underground)
UK Power Networks
East of England, 
South East and 
London 8.1 11,261                   
Only distribution:                         
28,583 (overhead)                         
85,749 (underground)
Source: Companies ' webs ites . 
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RAM. Unsubscribed capacity or subscribed capacity that drops out can be auctioned in the 
next auction. Two auctions per year (one every six months) were initially required, however 
an additional auction (RAM 5) was authorised in order to meet the authorised RAM capacity 
allocation (up to 1,330 MW) and to replace any executed RAM contract which may fail or 
may be terminated. The RAM 5 auction took June 27, 2014 and the total capacity to be 
procured by the IOUs is 464.7 MW. Table 2 shows the capacity bid and contracted and also 
the number of contracts regarding each IOU for the latest four auctions. Figures suggest that 
75.6% of the total capacity allocated to the IOUs (1,330 MW) has already been contracted in 
the first four auctions. 
 
Table 2: Offers (capacity) and number of contracts for each IOU under the RAM 
 
The weighted average price (post-time-of-delivery adjusted) in relation to the first two 
auctions was less than US$90/MWh (excluding transmission costs) and in the third auction 
was less than US$80/MWh [15]. According to [13] offer prices have shown a download trend 
from RAM 1 to RAM 4. Auctions by each utility are held simultaneously in order to promote 
competition across bidders. Individual or multiple offers can be submitted. RAM allows three 
types of products.  Table 3 also shows the share of capacity contracted over total capacity bid 
(offers to SCE) for each auction and per product. 
 
Table 3: SCE capacity contracted per type of product  
 
The products are: (1) baseload – geothermal, biomass, (2) peaking as-available – solar PV, 
and (3) non-peaking as available – wind, hydro; and can accommodate full buy/sell or excess 
sales options. IOUs have set specific targets for each type of product based on their portfolio 
needs. Solar PV is the one with the highest share of total capacity. SCE has already procured 
a total of 529.3 MW in the first four auctions. 
 
A pro forma PPA is available before the due date of the bidding and has to be approved by 
the CPUC. IOUs are responsible for elaborating their own pro forma based on the mandated 
RAM framework [16]. In relation to contractual terms and conditions, generators can select 
from three options for contract length: 10, 15 or 20 years. However, the length can be 
extended in the presence of banked curtailed energy (classed as curtailed return term). The 
banked energy curtailed refers to the cumulative quantity in any Term Year of curtailed 
                                                                                                                                                        
  
Utility
# # # # 
Bid contracted contracts Bid contracted contracts Bid contracted contracts Bid contracted contracts
SCE 754.4 1,260  67 7 2,133  97 6 1,928  201.5 13 2,021  163.8 10
PG&E 420.9 1,537  62.7 4 1,678  120.1 7 1,444  115 6 1,546  73.3 5
SDG&E 154.7 221      15 2 719 22.9 2 1,162  41.7 4 1,179  25.5 4
Total 1,330 3,018  144.7 13 4,530  240 15 4,534  358.2 23 4,746  262.6 19
Source: [11,12,13,14]
RAM 4 (Jun-13)
Capacity (MW) Capacity (MW) Capacity (MW)
Total capacity 
allocated to each 
IOU (MW)
Capacity (MW)
RAM 1 (Nov-11) RAM 2 (May-12) RAM 3 (Dec-12)
SCE
No. of 
RAM Baseload
Peaking as 
available
Non- 
peaking 
as 
available Total Baseload
Peaking 
as 
available
Non- 
peaking 
as 
available Baseload
Peaking 
as 
available
Non- 
peaking 
as 
available
RAM 1 0 67 0 67 0% 5% 0% 0% 8% 0%
RAM 2 0 97 0 97 0% 5% 0% 0% 5% 0%
RAM 3 0 194 7.5 202 0% 11% 5% 0% 11% 6%
RAM 4 0 128 35.8 164 0% 6% 11% 0% 8% 8%
Total 0 486 43.3 529.3
Source: [13]
% (contracts)% (capacity contracted)Capacity contracted per type of product (MW)
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product that exceeds the curtailment cap and for which it is paid the product price. For further 
details about the payments given to generators associated with the curtailment cap see [17]. 
The commercial operation deadline has been set in 24 months from the date of the CPUC 
approval. Generators are also subject to two kinds of deposits, development security and 
performance assurance.  
In terms of interconnection, generators are required a complete System Impact Study or 
Phase I Interconnection study or passed Fast Tract Screen. In the case of RAM 4, these 
studies must guarantee an interconnection date on or before December 2, 2015. Generators 
can bid their projects based on Energy Only (EO) or Full Capacity Deliverability Status 
(FCDS) interconnection. The last one is eligible to provide Resource Adequacy (RA) which 
represents the ability of the electric system to ensure adequate resources as required for 
reliability in the future. Interactive maps with relevant information about the status of the 
distribution network are also available for potential bidders free of charge.   
Regarding price, the offer price includes not only the product price but also any transmission 
upgrade costs required for the connection. This means that the evaluated price includes all the 
costs to build, interconnect and operate the generating facility for a specific period. If a 
generator bids as FCDS, then the RA benefits are estimated by the utility and are taken into 
account for elaborating the ranking. The ranking is established per type of product starting 
with the least expensive until the overall capacity target (plus or minus 20 MW) is reached. 
According to SCE, ranking is done by the IOUs, based on a CPUC approved ranking 
methodology. In terms of the evaluation process, an Independent Evaluator (IE) is required. 
IOUs are free to select their respective IE. Usually a specific website is created for this 
purpose allowing to bid online.  
3.2 Renewable Resources Request for Proposal - Public Service Company of Colorado 
(All-Source Solicitation process)  
 
The Public Service Company of Colorado (PSCo), an Xcel Energy subsidiary, is the largest 
IOU in Colorado. PSCo is a vertically-integrated utility providing generation, transmission 
and distribution services and provides electricity and gas services to around 1.4m and 1.3m 
customers. PSCo retail electricity and gas sales represent 60% and 70% respectively of the 
total sales in Colorado [18].  
The 2013 All-Source Solicitation process was proposed in the PSCo Electric Resource Plan 
(ERP) as a response of the requirements set by the Colorado Public Utilities Commission in 
its Resource Planning Rules (RP Rules) [19]. Four RFPs have been included in this 
Solicitation: (1) Dispatchable Resources RFP, (2) Renewable Resources RFP, (3) Semi-
Dispatchable Renewable Capacity Resources RFP and (4) Production Tax Credit – Wind 
Resources RFP. Dispatchable resources refer to simple gas turbines, combined cycle gas 
turbines, stand-alone storage projects. The Semi-Dispatchable Renewable Capacity 
Resources refer to solar thermal with thermal storage or fuel back-up and any other 
intermittent resource with storage or fuel backup.  Renewable Resources include wind, solar 
without storage or fuel backup, hydroelectric, geothermal, biomass and recycled energy. 
Some limitations on the size of capacity are applied based on the Commission’s Renewable 
Energy Standard rules. Production Tax Credit – Wind Resources are represented by those 
wind power plants that are entitled to a Federal Production Tax Credit
11
. All these are issued 
simultaneously by PSCo. The purpose of the All-Source Solicitation process is to acquire 
enough resources in order to meet the utility’s forecasted electric demand (plus a 16.3% 
planning reserve) over the 7-year Resource Acquisition Period –RAP - (2012-2018). The 
                                                 
11
 PTC provides a US$2.3-cent/kWh incentive for the first ten years of a renewable energy facility’s operation. 
PCT has been extended many times and finally expired at the end of 2013.    
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total capacity to be filled is around 250 MW over this period. This assumes the continued 
operation of the Arapahoe 4 (109 MW summer capacity) and Cherokee 4 (352 MW summer 
capacity) units on natural gas. However, without this assumption the required capacity would 
be around 719 MW by 2018 [20]. 
Only with some exceptions, the All Source Solicitation RFPs across the different categories 
are very similar. In terms of the project structure and capacity per project, this mechanism 
allows, along with the purchase of energy, the option of acquiring the generation facility 
during or at the end of the contract term. However, PSCo anticipates that the majority of RFP 
proposals will be for the purchase of energy by the utility based on a PPA. Additionally, 
proposals shall be for a new, existing or to-be-built resource. The nameplate capacity of the 
project must be greater than or equal to 10 MW. PSCo has stated that this size gives the 
option to connect projects at distribution level that may contribute to overcome lower cost 
energy from larger projects (which benefit from economies of scale). This value also helps to 
restrict the number of unwarranted number of bid submissions [19]. Figure 1 depicts the 
number of bids received and the nameplate capacity per type of product.  
 
Figure 1: Aggregated bidders’ nameplate capacity and number of bids 
 
Accordingly to PSCo, all the bids regarding solar PV and wind refer to new generation units. 
Bids for gas-fired refer to a combination of both new and existing generation units. 
Regarding contractual terms, PSCo required developers to start commercial operation prior to 
May 1, 2018. However, the utility is also interested in acquiring cost efficient wind projects, 
especially those that make use of the current Production Tax Credits (PTC Wind Resources). 
For this reason, PSCo performed two parallel evaluations: (1) the wind projects that expect to 
begin construction prior to January 1, 2014 (i.e. PTC Wind Binds) and (2) all other bids 
including wind bids. In relation to the length of contract, the bidders may select between 
short-term bids or long-term bids. Short-term bids attract the attention of existing facilities, 
and it is expected that these are in a position to offer a lower bid in comparison with the new 
or to-be-built generation facilities. Bidders, for a single bid fee, may propose up to two 
contract term lengths for each proposal (short-term and long-term with same commercial 
operation date). A fixed non-refundable fee has been set for each proposal submitted. 
Individual or multiple proposals are accepted. The RP Rules also required the appointment of 
an Independent Evaluator (IE) in order to observe the bid solicitation and conduct a review of 
the utility’s evaluation of proposals. 
Source: [21]
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Concerning interconnection issues, projects can opt for connecting to the transmission or to 
the distribution network. Those projects that apply for connection to the transmission network 
are not required to have any existing interconnection agreement or an existing 
interconnection queue position. In this situation, PSCo will estimate the interconnection 
requirements and costs.  
The evaluation process includes an assessment of non-economic and economic criteria and 
involves a multi-stage process. Only those proposals that meet the minimum requirements are 
eligible for evaluation. The non-economic criteria involve different factors, among these are 
financial strength, development, construction and operational experience, generator 
technology, availability and warranties; and land use permitting. In terms of the economic 
evaluation, this has two stages. In the first one, the “all-in” levelised cost of energy (LEC) is 
estimated. LEC should reflect the proposed price; any cost associated with any new or 
upgraded interconnection facilities and network upgrade costs, and any applicable resource 
integration costs. PSCo will incur the costs of upgrading or reinforcing the utility’s 
transmission system beyond the Point of Delivery. These costs are usually socialised. Figure 
2 illustrates the levelised prices of wind and solar PV generation units
12
. It is observed that 
prices associated with solar PV are higher than those related to wind technology. Economies 
of scale are also noted, the lower the nameplate capacity, the higher the levelised prices. 
However, according to PSCo the two peaks observed refers to the two bids made by an out-
of-state generator which required over 100 miles of new transmission lines. This fact 
increased importantly the incremental transmission costs included in the bid price. In addition, 
the bid price also included the load-ratio share of the utility estimated costs (the current 
transmission system was not able to handle the required injection level).     
 
Figure 2: Levelised Price - wind and solar PV only 
 
The second stage involves a computer modelling (Strategist
TM
) and portfolio development. 
The aim of this stage is to capture the interaction between a bid or group of bids (portfolio) 
with the utility’s existing generation resources to serve the system needs over time. The 
computer model is used to develop portfolios that minimise the net present value of revenue 
requirements over the forty year planning period (i.e. 2011-2050) [19].  
                                                 
12
 Bid information disclosure is required by the RP Rules after the completion of the competitive acquisition 
process (i.e. after the execution of all PPAs) [20].  
Source: Data provided by PSCo. 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
0 200 400 600 800 1000
le
ve
li
se
d
 c
o
st
 o
f 
en
er
gy
 (
U
S$
/M
W
h
)
nameplate capacity (MW)
wind bids 
solar PV bids 
 11 
 
In the development of portfolios, PSCo has accommodated bids to specific zones (i.e. Wind 
Zone, Solar Zone) in order to assign proposed wind sites to a proxy wind generation shape 
and facilitate the evaluation. Results from the computer-based modelling suggested a core set 
of bids across varying technologies (preferred portfolio) that amounts to 809 MW of firm 
capacity comprised of existing gas-fired (25%), existing natural gas (35%), new solar PV 
(13%) and wind (27%) generation units.  This considers the continued operation of Cherokee 
4 generation unit.   
3.3 Renewable Energy Resources Request for Proposal – Portland General Electric 
Company  
 
Portland General Electric Company (PGE), a vertically-integrated electric utility, is the 
largest IOU in Oregon in terms of retail electricity sales (36%) and serves around 0.8m 
customers. In October 2012, PGE issued the Renewable Energy Resource RFP [22] as a 
response to the resource needs for future demand established in the 2009 Integrated Resource 
Plan (IRP). The Action Plan proposed in the IRP included a set of actions that needed to be 
undertaken for guaranteeing new supply to be placed no later than 2015. The Action Plan 
involved a mix of new energy efficiency, renewable resources and efficient natural gas 
generation for energy and capacity needs [23].  
 
In the RFP, PGE was seeking to acquire around 101 MWa (average dispatch capacity over 
year) of viable renewable energy resources including, but not limited to biomass, wind, 
geothermal and solar, which must meet the requirements of Oregon’s RPS. Capacity caps for 
each renewable technology were not set. Two kinds of products were defined: (1) firm 
physical energy purchase – with a minimum of 10 MW; where PGE was entitled to add the 
estimated costs of obtaining specific services (in case the bidder was not able to provide 
firmness, regulation, ancillary services for the integration of the product); and (2) ownership 
position in a renewable energy resource, which allowed different mechanisms for the 
acquisition of existing plants, projects, or hybrid structures. The start date of operation has 
been set not earlier than January 2013 and no later than 2017 with a preference by the end of 
2015. The length of the contract was for a minimum of 10 year with a target of 20+ years. In 
addition, a non-refundable bid fee was mandated in order to encourage high quality bids and 
bidders. The same bid fee applied to a base proposal along with two alternatives proposals for 
the same resource.  
 
There were two kinds of bids under this RFP: (1) a benchmark bid and (2) a third party bid. 
Regarding the first one, PGE was allowed to submit one or more benchmark proposals. These 
refer to site-specific and self-built proposals (benchmark resources) presented by PGE and 
may represent a potential cost-based alternative for customers. The second one represents 
proposals received from third parties. Benchmark bids were received two weeks prior to the 
price bids and were also subject to the evaluation process. If the bidder did not provide 
adequate performance assurance, ancillary services or integration services, PGE retained the 
right to include in the bid price the costs to PGE of services. PGE has estimated the 
integration cost regarding wind and solar in US$9.15/MWh (2014 prices) and in 
US$6.35/MWh (2009 prices) respectively.   
 
In terms of the evaluation process, bids were evaluated using a two-step process: (1) 
assessment of pre-qualifications and (2) evaluation of scoring factors. In the first one the 
evaluation took into account pre-established qualifying criteria. In the second one, PGE 
scored bids that have met the pre-qualification standards using non-price factors that 
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comprise 40% of the evaluation criteria and price factors the other 60%. The non-price 
factors reflect performance risks and operational attributes of the bid proposals (e.g. dispatch 
flexibility, resource term, portfolio diversity). The price score was calculated as the ratio of 
the bid projected total cost per MWh to the forecast market prices using real-levelised or 
annuity methods. As previously mentioned, the total costs included the energy price plus 
other associated costs (e.g. O&M, integration ancillary services costs).  
 
The selection of an initial shortlist of bids was made based on price and non-price factors. 
The final shortlist of bids was based on the results of the portfolio modelling. Initially, 26 
ownership bids and 29 third party bids were carried forward to the price and non-price 
evaluation process and were ranked according to their total score. Based on the capacity 
required, the initial shortlist included 13 bids (12 wind bids and 1 hydro bid), with 690 MWa. 
After the adjustments made by DNV KEMA in relation to capacity factor, the 13 bids were 
included in the portfolio analysis. DNV KEMA recommended for most offers to decrease the 
capacity factor by 1-2%, the maximum decrease being 4%. A total of 22 portfolios were 
analysed using PGE’s Aurora XMP production cost model. The final shortlist was developed 
by eliminating the least competitive economically and those that had substantial qualitative 
risk. On March 11, 2013 the IE completed the evaluation of bids and provided to the OPUC 
the final assessment of the bid scoring and the final shortlist selection, comprised of seven 
projects [24]. PGE selected the Lower Snake River Phase 2 wind farm
13
 (with a nameplate 
capacity of 266.8 MW), which had the lowest cost and lowest risk project for customers and 
the utility [25]. Table 4 shows the winner project characteristics.   
 
Table 4: Summary of bid winner – Lower Snake River Phase 2 Wind Farm 
 
3.4 Renewable Capacity and Energy Requests for Proposals – Long Island Power Au-
thority  
 
The Long Island Power Authority (LIPA) is a non-profit municipal electric provider that 
owns the electric transmission and distribution system on Long Island (New York) and 
provides electricity to around 1.1m customers in Nassau, Suffolk and the Rockaway 
Peninsula (Queens). LIPA is the second largest municipal electric utility in the USA in terms 
of electric revenues and the third largest in terms of number of customers. Even though LIPA 
does not fall under the jurisdiction of the New York State’s RPS, LIPA is committed to 
increase a large percentage of renewable resources to its resource portfolio. In this RFP, 
LIPA was looking for proposals for 280 MW of new, on-island, renewable capacity and 
energy [27]. Proposal submissions were expected by end of March 2014. Among the 
technologies accepted are solar PV, wind, biomass, fuel cells, hydroelectric, tidal and wave 
energy, others. The minimum project size is 2 MW and the maximum is 280 MW. The 
maximum capacity awarded to fuel-based renewables in this RFP is 40 MW. Developers or 
                                                 
13
 PGE changed the name to Tucannon River Wind Farm. 
Project Name Lower Snake River Phase II Project Costs (US$ m)
Number of turbines 116 Capex 500
Nameplate capacity/t 2.3 MW Opex 7.5
Turbine manufacturer Siemens Insurances and A&G costs 0.4
Capacity factor 36.80% Net variable power costs -22.3
Ownership option Yes Depreciation (30 year) 23.7
Project lifetime 20 years Property taxes 6.9
Initial operation first half of 2015 Production Tax Credits -19.8
Interconnection At transmission level (230 kV) Net revenue requirement (US$ m) 40.4
Source: [25,26]. Costs and revenues updated to July 2014.
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generators must specify the type of technology and the estimated average annual/hourly of 
net energy production to be delivered to LIPA at the interconnection point.  The RFP requires 
the execution of a 20-year PPA with LIPA. Similar to the rest of the case studies, a draft of 
the PPA is also available at the utility’s website. The figure of independent evaluator is not 
applicable in this competitive solicitation. LIPA is in charge of managing and evaluating the 
proposal and all the related documents posted in its website are accessible to anyone without 
the need of registering. Transmission data will be provided by LIPA only if a request is made 
(via the RFP website). LIPA will assist the interested respondents by providing a load flow, 
contingency list, and a one-line diagram around an electrical bus at the proposed 
interconnection point. Similar to the previous case studies, there is a submission fee which 
depends on the project size. The fee is a non-refundable but it can be returned only if the 
proposal is not submitted by the proposal submission deadline. LIPA allows multiple 
proposals by a single bidder.  
 
In terms of interconnection, there are two kinds of procedures based on the project size. 
Projects up to 20 MW should follow the LIPA’s Small Generator Interconnection Procedures 
(SGIP) and projects larger than 20 MW should follow the New York Independent System 
Operator (NYISO) Large Generators Interconnection Procedures (LGIP).  It is expected that 
the project would be able to operate on or before December 31, 2018. The project must be 
connected to the LIPA transmission or distribution network or to a new transmission line or 
provide a new transmission capacity onto Long Island. In addition, this RFP does not offer 
the option of ownership (LIPA only provides transmission and distribution services).  
Regarding pricing, LIPA is asking for a firm price (price is not open to negotiation). Price is 
all-inclusive (including fuel price in US$/MWh, if applicable). The costs associated with 
attachment facilities and system upgrades constructed and owned by LIPA should be 
reimbursed by respondents. These costs may be recovered by respondents through PPA 
charges.  
Proposals are evaluated based on two criteria: (1) the quantitative evaluation criteria and (2) 
the qualitative evaluation criteria. The quantitative evaluation considers the all-in costs of the 
proposal. It includes the PPA charges (including fuel costs, if applicable), transmission 
reinforcement costs, system impacts (e.g. impact on operating reserve requirements, 
transmission transfer capability, NYISO capacity requirements, ancillary services, etc.), 
beneficial system impacts if Commercial Operation Date (COD) is met in advance, among 
others. The qualitative criteria include different factors such as site control and characteristics, 
community acceptance, quality proposal, ability to meet proposed COD, integration with 
LIPA system, among others. The RFP does not specify any specific weight for these criteria.  
Based on the RFP schedule, the selection of the proposals and the execution of contracts are 
planned by the end of December 2014 and by the first quarter of 2016 respectively. This 
means that LIPA will not be signing contracts with developers until 2016 even if the project 
is awarded in December 2014. This is explained by the fact that according to the New York 
Public Service Law, a PPA can be effective only after receiving a certificate of environmental 
compatibility and public need from the New York State Board on Electric Generation Siting 
and the Environment.  
 
4. Discussion of cases studies, lessons and proposal of competitive mechanism design  
 
The case studies refer to vertically-integrated utilities which are allowed to produce and 
procure distribution generation resources by competitive mechanisms regardless of the firm 
size. The capacity allocated to each competition varies across the four cases. In general, the 
size of the capacity (total capacity or product capacity) is in line with the RPS targets that the 
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Public Utilities Commissions have set in their respective jurisdictions. Three out of four of 
the cases studies refer to more sophisticated auction process (RFP) subject to qualitative and 
quantitative evaluation criteria, including the use of computer modelling in order to develop 
and identify the most cost-efficient portfolio (especially when the ownership option is 
offered). In comparison with the auction schemes, the scope of RFP is wider and may include 
a group of renewable energy resources, a specific renewable energy resource or a 
combination of both renewable and non-renewable energy resources. 
 
The evaluation criteria across the four case studies mandated in general the selection of those 
projects with the lowest prices (US$/MWh) after the inclusion of additional costs such as 
transmission upgrade costs (memo: transmission voltages start at 66kV in the US), O&M, 
ancillary services, and some other costs. The selection of those projects with the lowest 
energy prices or most cost-efficient portfolios is supported by the fact that electric utilities are 
entitled to purchase electricity in order to meet the customer demand. Even though the 
transmission costs are usually socialised among all the grid users (or initially born by 
generators which are refunded later on), it makes sense to add these costs to the total offer. 
This encourages the selection and implementation of the least expensive projects not only in 
terms of tariffs but also in terms of connection costs (sole use assets and reinforcement costs, 
if applicable). The bid price is usually non-negotiable in order to guarantee a fair treatment 
among all bidders and to simplify the process; however, negotiations were allowed by PGE 
only on the top-rated bid. Following [25] this encourage bidders to submit their best offers 
and to compare resources and select the short list based on the project’s true costs. Excluding 
RAM, all solicitations have asked for a bid evaluation fee. This helps to reduce the number of 
speculative offers and to increase the chance of better evaluations to be carried out by the 
Independent Evaluator (IE) / electric utilities. Deposits have been also required by electric 
utilities (against development and performance assurance). As previously mentioned, the 
absence of penalties was one of the major problems of the Non Fossil Fuel Obligations 
scheme in the UK, which was based on a bidding mechanism [9]. 
 
4.1 Applying a DG procurement auction in Europe 
The RAM and RFPs schemes analysed in this study represent two different well-developed 
competitive mechanisms that have contributed to the selection of the most cost-efficient 
energy projects. Results from consecutive auctions with similar products (e.g. RAM), have 
shown that the average bid price has decreased over time regarding the first four auctions. 
The two schemes also represent well-documented decentralised auction mechanisms carried 
out by electric utilities. Most of the relevant documentation is on the utilities and IE websites. 
Even though, these have been applied by vertically-integrated electric firms, we think that a 
similar auction design can be put in practise by the DSOs from Europe taking into 
consideration the EC third package. As already mentioned, DSOs with more than 100,000 
customers, which are around 253 [2], are not allowed to purchase electricity. However, this 
fact does not prevent these DSOs from implementing similar competitive mechanisms. One 
way is to allow DSOs to allocate only generation capacity, where the cost of connection is 
bid. The other way is by conducting a competitive mechanism in association with a local 
supplier where the bid price will include not only the connection costs but also the purchase 
of energy by a third party supplier (which could be a licensed electricity supplier or a national 
government energy procurement authority). Thus the difference between our case studies and 
this specific case is the nature of the counterparty to the contract (three instead of two). For 
vertically integrated DSOs with less than 100,000 customers, which are around 2,347 [2], a 
similar approach such as the RAM can be followed, which represents the most 
straightforward approach. In agreement with the rules given by the energy Public Utilities 
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Commissions in relation to the auction mechanisms, national energy regulators from the 
member states should be involved in promoting this kind of initiatives not only as trials but as 
business as usual. Countries where the unbundling rule has already been transposed into 
national law (11 out of 24, as of July 2012), may represent suitable places for the application 
of decentralised auction mechanisms. The implementation of competitive mechanisms is also 
in line with the aim of the EC third package, especially in keeping prices as low as possible.  
Competitive mechanisms, not only help to the selection of the most cost-efficient projects and 
depending on their periodicity (i.e. two auctions every year), might also help the DSOs to 
manage the increase in the number of DG connection enquiries and related issues (i.e. large 
number of speculative connections and low rate of connection offer acceptance). For instance 
in Great Britain DNOs are required to connect DG facilities on a first-come first-serve basis 
and to facilitate competition in supply by allowing licensed suppliers to use their distribution 
network for the transport of energy from the transmission system (or DG) to customers. UK 
Power Networks, the largest DNO in Great Britain, indicates that the number of DG 
connection enquiries has increased significantly, from 208 in 2008 to 6,879 in 2013. Most 
part of enquiries refers to photovoltaic technology (87.8%) followed by wind (6.2%). 
Another GB DNO, Northern Powergrid (NPG), has also shown a large increase in the number 
of enquiries, from 1,300 in 2010 to 5,300 in 2012 [28]. This demonstrates the challenge that 
DNOs are facing in providing quotes within the timelines set in the Guarantee Standards of 
Practice (GSoP). UK Power Networks is also the DNO with the lowest rate of acceptance of 
DG connections, 5.5% and 7% in 2012 and 2013 respectively. Scottish Power has a rate 
above 80% and Scottish and Southern Energy a rate of 40% [3]. In other European countries, 
a similar behaviour would be expected, especially in those countries where renewable energy 
sources have priority connection to the grid system. Among these countries are Germany, 
Italy, Portugal, Belgium and Spain [29].  
 
4.2 A Proposal of Competitive Mechanism Design for Connection Only 
Another option to accelerate lower cost connection in Europe, in the context of the third 
package, is to simply have an auction for connection to the DNO network. This takes existing 
subsidy regimes for renewable generation as given (e.g. the presence of a national FIT). An 
auction process is then used to allocate the available capacity for connection of new DG at a 
particular Point of Connection (POC). Each DG bids a maximum willingness to pay per MW 
of connected capacity, subject to a minimum value which covers the cost of connection. 
Scarce connection capacity can be allocated on the basis of the highest firm bids for 
connection at each POC. An example of such a competitive mechanism design elements 
applicable to the UK context
14
 is shown in Table 5.  
Table 5: Competitive Mechanism Auction Design 
                                                 
14
 A related auction initiative has already been proposed by Northern Powergrid in the RIIO-ED1 Business Plan. 
The DNO has proposed the implementation of a reverse capacity auction for Demand Side Response via online 
[30]. 
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In relation to the product, the process is open to any kind of technology (renewable or non-
renewable). There is no specific requirement in terms of the generator size. This mainly will 
depend on the available capacity at each POC, pre-determined site, to be specified by the 
DNO. Regarding the counterparties, they would be the DNO and the DG customers and a 
connection agreement would be required. If the energy price is also  included in the bid price, 
a third party (e.g. suppliers, trading party, system operator) would be required because DNOs 
are not allowed to purchase energy from generators and a PPA would be also necessary [31]. 
In terms of the evaluation and selection criteria, and in agreement with the case studies 
analysed, we also recommend a set of pre-qualification criteria (without scoring) in order to 
select those generators with the highest chance of actually connecting. In the existence of 
network constraints, generators may be subject to the reduction of their generation output 
(curtailment).  
There are different curtailment methods (called Principle of Access), among there are LIFO, 
Pro Rata and Market-Based [17]. If a market-based approach is selected, compensation or 
any other incentive to generators should be defined in the connection agreement
15
. Similar to 
the RAM scheme, we would suggest to carrying out 2 auctions per year and also to give 
preference to those projects that are able to connect within the two or three years of the 
connection agreement. The appointment of an independent evaluator provides more 
transparency to the bidding process, equal treatment among bidders, sets standard evaluation 
criteria, and provides equal access to relevant information and documents (online). We think 
the experience of SCE, PSCo and PGEC suggests an independent evaluator is a good idea. 
The collection of bid evaluation fees would reduce speculative DG connection proposals. We 
suggest a payment based on the nameplate capacity (£/MW) with the possibility of refund if 
generators place winning bids. Deposits (for development security and performance 
assurance) should also be required to increase the chance of selecting the DG customers that 
can meet their obligations to generate as set out in the connection agreement. We also 
encourage online submissions and the provision of relevant information (excel sheets, pro-
                                                 
15
 This study is only focused on the implementation of a competitive mechanism for allocating DG capacity. 
However, competitive mechanisms can also been applied to the management of generation output (curtailment). 
For further details about commercial models that cover different options of active management of DG see [32].  
Concept Competitive Mechanism
Product Only DG connections 
All technologies (renewable and non-renewable)
Generator size: subject to the capacity estimated at each Point of Connection (POC)
Counterparties DG and DNO
Evaluation/selection criteria Based on pre-qualification criteria and connection cost (£/MW) 
Highest offers (connect now) or bids are the ones selected first (subject to available capacity at POC)
Operational date: no more than 2/3 years
Curtailment 1/ Methods: LIFO/Pro Rata (FPP), no compensation
In case of Market-based (compensation schemes/incentives)
If generators are part of the Balancing Mechanism (BM), they may be compensated in case of curtailment
Number of auctions/year 2
Independent evaluator Yes 
Evaluation fee Yes (£/MW) with option of refund to those that bid at least once (but are no winners)
Online payment
Deposits Yes (development security, performance assurance)
Submission Proposal to be submitted  online 
Online material/requirements Excel sheet: As reference for estimation of potential revenues 
Pro Forma Connection Agreement
Interactive network connection map with potential POCs
Documentation: Specifications of minimum documentation to be provided by the respondents to the 
DNO
1/ There are different methods for reducing generation output: LIFO (last-in first-out: the last on the list is the first to be curtailed), Pro rata (curtailment is equally allocated among 
all generators), Market-based (generators compete to be curtailed by offering a price based on market mechanism). For further details see [17]. 
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forma contracts, interactive maps) that may facilitate the proposal submissions and 
evaluations.  
Even though the example given is in relation to the UK electricity market, we believe that a 
similar approach can be replicated by other DSOs from Europe taking into consideration the 
third package rules. In terms of the auction methods, from the cases studies, a sealed non-
negotiable bid is the method selected in the majority of cases with the option of negotiation in 
only one case. However, [6] suggest that for renewable auctions a hybrid approach composed 
of descending-clock phase (price discovery) followed by sealed-bid (for preventing collusion) 
is the most recommended. The advantages and disadvantages of these or additional methods 
are considered elsewhere. For further details about the different methods see [33]. 
 
5.   Final Remarks  
 
Four cases studies from California, Colorado, Oregon and New York have been selected in 
order to gain a better understanding of the way in which competitive mechanisms for the 
procurement of energy resources have been implemented and to explore different options for 
the application of competitive mechanism for the acceleration of DG connections in a cost-
efficient way. Public Utilities Commissions (which enforce the state-level regulation at 
distribution and transmission level) play an important role in the development of different 
competitive or non- competitive approaches that electric utilities have implemented to 
achieve the RPS targets for each jurisdiction. We have observed a similar behaviour across 
electric utilities (private and public) in the way in which competitive competitions such as 
RFP or auctions (e.g. RAM) are being managed.  
 
One of the main advantages of competitive mechanisms, in comparison with those where the 
tariffs are set administratively (e.g. FIT), is the possibility given to the market to define the 
price; this is then translated into lower bid prices and lower costs to customers (by selecting 
the most cost-efficient energy projects). Transmission or distribution upgrades, if required, 
might impact importantly the bid price due to the increase in marginal transmission or 
distribution costs (e.g. when a generator is an out-state generator and/or the system cannot 
handle the new capacity due to system issues). In order to capture any additional costs and to 
make appropriate comparisons among competitors, the bid price should reflect the total 
costs/benefits (connection, reinforcement, additional services). The four case studies have 
followed the same pattern by suggesting the inclusion of all the related costs in the bid. 
 
Even though the four experiences explored refer to vertically integrated electric utilities, we 
believe that the method can be applied to DSOs taking into consideration the EU third 
package rules. The example provided in relation to the auction design elements focused on 
the UK electricity context, by defining the bid price based only on the capacity required 
(£/MW). This approach can be applied to any DSO in Europe with more than 100,000 
customers. However, suppliers could also run the auction process would be very similar to 
the one applied by the electric utilities from USA, where connection and energy are bid. For 
European DSOs with less than 100,000 customers and that are vertically integrated, a third 
party purchaser of the energy would not be required. In addition, well-designed competitive 
mechanisms would also help DSOs (such as those in the UK) to manage more efficiently 
issues related to DG connection enquiries (e.g. large number of speculative connections and 
the low rate of connection offer acceptance).  
 
Similar to the Public Utilities Commissions from the USA, energy regulators in Europe 
would be very involved in the design of the new competitive mechanisms discussed in this 
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paper. They already regulate national auction regimes and could readily oversee more 
decentralised competitive strategies that allow DSOs to manage more efficiently the increase 
of DG connections taking into account the EU third package rules.  
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